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We estimate the pricing determinants for 35,098 payday loans originated in Colorado 
between 2000 and 2006, and generate a number of results with implications for public 
policy.  We find evidence consistent with classical price competition early in the 
sample, but as time passed these competitive effects faded and the data become more 
consistent with a variety of strategic pricing practices.  On average, loan prices moved 
upward toward the legislated price ceiling over time, consistent with implicit collusion 
facilitated by price focal points.  Large multi-store payday firms tended to charge higher 
prices than independent single-store operators, but were less likely to exploit inelastic 
demand near military bases and in largely minority neighborhoods.  Of the three loan 
pricing measures used in our analysis, the annual percentage interest rate (APR) favored 
by regulators and analysts performed poorly. 
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1.  Introduction 
Payday loans provide short-term liquidity for households with bank accounts and regular 
paychecks who have depleted, or choose not to tap, their other lines of credit.  Payday lenders provide 
these households with immediate cash, charge no up-front fee, and in exchange receive collateral in the 
form of a post-dated personal check in the amount of the loan.  After two weeks (or some similar period 
coinciding with their next pay date) borrowers can either repay the loan principal plus a finance charge or 
they can pay just the finance charge and refinance the principal with another payday loan.  While payday 
loans are a very expensive form of credit—a typical $300 two-week loan might carry a $50 finance 
charge, which amounts to a 435% annual percentage rate (APR) of interest—they have become a popular 
alternative to other sources of small denomination personal credit such as checking account overdrafts or 
pawn loans.
1  The U.S. payday loan industry has grown rapidly, from a few hundred payday loan “stores” 
in the mid-1990s to well over 20,000 stores today (Snar 2002, Stegman 2007).  Despite its growing 
market popularity, payday lending is barraged by third-party criticism.  Consumer activist groups 
compare payday lending to loan sharking, and argue that serial refinancing by payday borrowers further 
impoverishes already financially vulnerable households.  The industry is regulated at the state level, and 
regulatory policies range widely state-by-state.  In 1998 just 19 states permitted payday lending, but the 
industry gained additional markets as state legislatures exempted payday lenders from existing usury 
ceilings; as of February 2008 eleven states prohibited payday lending, eight states allowed payday lenders 
to operate without any special regulations, and the remaining states permitted payday lenders to operate 
under a variety of regulatory constraints (Samolyk 2006, Flannery and Samolyk 2007, Nicholson 2008).     
The high prices that households pay for payday credit, and the chronic nature of payday 
borrowing among many of these households, have been documented thoroughly both by policy advocates 
and academic researchers (see Section 2 below).  But while these facts about loan price levels and repeat 
borrowing frequencies are important, they are incomplete inputs for informing good public policy; next to 
no attention has been paid to whether, how, and by how much payday loan prices vary across lenders and 
                                                 
1 The calculation is as follows:  APR = $50 * (365 days / 14 days ) / $300 = 4.3452 = 434.52%.    2
across borrowers.  Forming effective public policy requires a better understanding of payday loan price 
determination.  For example, in an industry in which entry barriers are extremely low, do increased 
numbers of payday firms create competition that puts downward pressure on prices?  Is there evidence 
that payday stores charge systematically higher prices to customers with more inelastic demand, such as 
repeat borrowers, borrowers in low income or minority neighborhoods, or military personnel?  Did 
pricing patterns changed as the industry evolved from mostly small Mom-and-Pop operations to large 
multi-store payday loan corporations?  How do regulatory pricing caps affect the pricing behaviors of 
payday lenders?  And is the standard APR pricing measure the best metric for understanding payday loan 
prices, or do better pricing constructs exist?  This study attempts to answer these and related questions 
about the determination of payday loan prices.  
We examine the variation in finance charges across a sample of 35,098 payday loans originated in 
Colorado between 2000 and 2006.  These data were compiled during compliance examinations conducted 
by the Colorado Office of the Attorney General at 610 payday stores operating in 117 different local 
markets and owned by 186 different payday lending companies.  While these unique data were collected 
for purposes of regulatory compliance, and as a result pose some challenges when used in a research 
study, they nonetheless allow us to test a number of hypotheses which to date are unaddressed in the 
literature.
2  We construct three different price variables from these data: the standard annual percentage 
rate (APR); a binomial variable indicating whether the loan carried the maximum finance charge allowed 
by Colorado law (BINDING); and the difference in dollars between the regulatory maximum price and the 
price that was actually charged (GAP).  Because these three prices exhibit different statistical 
distributions, we use ordinary least squares, logit, and Tobit estimation techniques, respectively, to test for 
pricing determinants.  We observe these loan prices at different points in time but the data themselves are 
not longitudinal (i.e., we observe each loan only once, at its origination).  We attempt to bring order to the 
data by clustering the standard errors on both the year in which the loan was made and on the payday firm 
that made the loan.  Payday lenders operated in only about one-quarter of the local markets in Colorado 
                                                 
2 See Pfenning (2005) for an exhaustive description of the compliance processes that generate these data.    3
during our sample period, so we employ a Heckman correction procedure to control for selection bias 
related to geographic location; this procedure generates some interesting byproduct results, which we 
present and briefly discuss in the Appendix.    
We find a number of statistically significant and economically meaningfully relationships linking 
payday loan prices to industry regulation, to local market conditions, and to numerous borrower and 
lender characteristics.  The existence of a regulatory price ceiling, and how it appears to have influenced 
firms’ pricing behavior, is central to our findings.  Upper limits on payday loan prices had just been 
established in Colorado at the beginning of our sample period, and the data show that payday loan finance 
charges gravitated systematically toward the price ceiling over time.  This pattern is consistent with 
Schelling’s (1960) observation that firms in oligopolistic markets will implicitly collude around price and 
non-price focal points, and is similar to Knittel and Stango’s (2003) findings for state-imposed credit card 
interest rate ceilings.  As this apparent implicit collusion become more complete, the average payday 
lender altered its pricing behavior.  For example, early in the sample when finance charges were still 
loosely distributed below the price ceiling, loans originated in markets with a large number of payday 
firms carried lower prices.  But later in the sample these competitive effects disappear and evidence 
consistent with strategic price behavior emerges.  Lenders begin charging lower prices to first-time 
customers (higher prices to repeat borrowers); moreover, these discounts are largest in local markets with 
the fewest competing payday loan firms, a result that echoes the dynamic pricing strategy posited by 
Petersen and Rajan (1994) for loans to informationally opaque small business borrowers.  Lenders also 
begin charging higher prices at stores in largely minority neighborhoods and at stores located near 
military bases, arguably local markets in which demand for payday loans should be relatively inelastic.
3 
The organizational form adopted by payday lenders is also central to our findings.  On average, 
payday stores affiliated with multiple-location payday companies charged higher prices than single-store 
Mom-and-Pop payday lenders.  But this result is far from uniform.  On-the-one-hand, multi-store payday 
                                                 
3 Our data sample ends in December 2006, prior to federal legislation that limited interest rates on loans to military 
personnel to 36% simple interest.    4
firms were more likely than independent payday stores to charge lower prices to first-time customers 
and/or to charge higher prices on long-maturity loans that roll over less frequently.  On-the-other-hand, 
multi-store firms tended to charge lower prices than single-store lenders near military bases and in 
minority neighborhoods; with higher franchise values at stake, these firms may have willingly absorbed 
small reductions in lending margins in order to reduce the headline risk associated with consumer 
advocate criticism (and the eventually possibility of regulatory intervention). 
All of these findings are strong and consistent for two of our three pricing variables; the exception 
is the APR pricing measure, for which our regression results are generally weaker and sometimes 
economically counter-intuitive.  APR is the yardstick used most often by industry critics to illustrate the 
high cost of payday credit, and it is frequently used to parameterize state laws and regulations that govern 
payday loan pricing.  Given that the APR is the accepted standard for gauging payday loan prices, these 
weak results should give us pause.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  We briefly review the main institutional 
features of payday lending, as well as the extant academic literature on payday lending, in Section 2.  In 
Section 3 we describe the regulatory environment facing payday lenders in Colorado, the strengths and 
weaknesses of the Colorado payday loan data, and the three different payday loan pricing measures used 
in this study.  Section 4 presents our statistical testing methodologies, and Section 5 presents the variables 
we use to specify those tests.  We analyze our test results in Section 6 and discuss the public policy 
implications of our findings in Section 7.   
 
2.  Payday Lending   
Payday lending has been around since at least the early 1900s, when lenders would purchase 
workers’ future paychecks at a discount (Caskey 2005).  This line of business was limited in scope, 
because lenders required soft information about the financial health of employers and the creditworthiness 
of employees in order to reduce the costs of adverse selection and moral hazard.  A century later, 
advances in information and financial technologies have substantially mitigated these costs and permitted   5
much wider access to payday credit.  An example is instructive: a payday borrower writes a post-dated 
personal check for $350 (the date on the check coincides with the direct deposit date of the borrower’s 
next paycheck), gives the check to a payday lender in exchange for $300 in cash, and pays no out-of-
pocket fees.  The lender approves the loan only after ascertaining the collateral value of the personal 
check (thus reducing adverse selection), using its access to inexpensive hard information from online 
consumer credit bureaus.
4  The loan has three possible outcomes.  The customer could pay off the loan 
any time within two weeks, paying the lender $350 cash to redeem the check.  Alternatively, the customer 
could extend the $300 loan for an additional two weeks by paying the lender the $50 finance charge.  If 
neither of these events occurs, then the lender will deposit the personal check immediately upon payday; 
direct payroll deposit and swift electronic check clearing make it more likely that the check will clear 
before the borrower withdraws the payroll funds (thus reducing moral hazard costs).   
The financial footprint of the payday loan industry is very small, but its demographic footprint is 
extensive.  The aggregate principal of all outstanding payday loans at any given point in time totals less 
than $2 billion, about the same size of the lending portfolio of a large community bank; still, an estimated 
9 to 14 million consumers borrow from payday lenders each year (Flannery and Samolyk 2006).  Because 
the payday lending production function requires customers to have checking accounts, payday borrowers 
are not part of the large “unbanked” population that lacks access to mainstream financial services.   
Nevertheless, payday lenders are typically characterized as providers of “fringe” financial services, along 
with pawn brokers, check cashers, automobile title lenders, etc.  Pawn shop revenues have declined as 
payday lenders have multiplied, perhaps indicating that consumers prefer the convenience of posting 
exact collateral in the form of a personal check to pawning physical collateral worth several times the 
loan amount.
5   
                                                 
4 The online service most often used by payday lenders is Teletrack, which tracks consumer check-bouncing history 
and payday loan defaults.   
5 For example, the number of pawn shops in Ohio declined by 20 percent after the state authorized payday lending in 
1995 (Burns 2008).  The popularity of Ebay and other online marketplaces has also contributed to the decline of 
pawn shops.    6
The centrality of the bank account in the payday loan production function suggests that the 
closest competitive substitutes for payday loans are not the products offered by fringe financiers, but the 
overdraft protection offered by mainstream banks, thrifts, and credit unions.  Most depository institutions 
offer some form on overdraft protection; for a fixed fee, the bank will cover (rather than bounce) a check 
written on an account with insufficient funds.  The APRs on checking account overdrafts can easily 
exceed those on payday loans: for example, if a bank charges a $20 fee to cover a $100 overdraft, and the 
customer brings the account back to a positive balance after two weeks, the APR would be 520% (Caskey 
2005).  An exhaustive study on overdraft protection performed at the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC 2008) finds that the average APR on a two-week checking account overdraft is 1,067 
percent.  Faced with having to bounce several checks—and thus having to incur the fixed overdraft 
charge several times—a depositor with a low checking account balance might rationally decide to take 
out a payday loan that covers all of her expenses and generates just a single fee.  Indeed, Elliehausen 
(2009) found that 80 percent of payday borrowers lacked sufficient funds in their checking accounts to 
meet their expenses, so by choosing a payday loan they avoided expensive account overdraft fees.  Aside 
from this study, there is little systematic empirical evidence about the marginal financial choices of 
payday borrowers. 
Payday lenders are licensed and regulated by the states in which they operate.  Limits on loan 
size, number of loans, and loan prices vary substantially across the states.  An unfortunate byproduct of 
this state-by-state approach is a lack of systematic data collection needed to support objective academic 
research.  Studies prepared or supported by consumer advocacy organizations (e.g., Center for 
Responsible Lending, Consumer Federation of America) assail payday lenders for charging usurious 
prices, for preying on unsophisticated and economically disadvantaged consumers, and for creating a 
“cycle of poverty” among these borrowers; not surprisingly, studies prepared or supported by 
organizations affiliated with the payday loan industry (Consumer Credit Research Foundation, Consumer 
Rights League) typically find evidence to the contrary, and argue against further regulation of the   7
industry.  The paucity of systematic, cross-state data can make objective confirmation or dismissal of 
such claims difficult. 
A profile of the demand side of the industry has emerged in the academic literature; one typical 
study finds that payday customers tend to be young adults with high school educations, are married with 
children, and over half carry major credit cards (Caskey 2005).  This profile, combined with the 
requirement that payday borrowers have bank accounts and receive steady income, suggests that payday 
demand is not driven by a lack of access to fundamental financial services.  Although payday loans are 
marketed as short-term credit vehicles to help bridge gap between now and the next payday, a substantial 
numbers of borrowers remain in payday debt across several pay periods.  For example, Elliehausen and 
Lawrence (2001) find that about half of the payday borrowers sampled from 19 payday firms had seven 
or more payday loans during the preceding twelve months; Chessin (2005) finds that over half of payday 
lenders’ loan volume in Colorado is from repeat customers; and Brown and Cushman (2006) report high 
rates of serial borrowing among U.S. servicemen.  There is scant evidence about the expectations of 
payday borrowers.  Bertrand and Morse (2009) survey payday borrowers and find some evidence of 
rational expectations: more than half of the surveyed borrowers expected to pay off their loans on time, 
but the mean borrower expected to refinance the loan one time.  Nevertheless, the high frequency of 
repeat borrowing—combined with evidence that payday stores tend to locate in minority neighborhoods 
(Temkin and Sawyer 2004; King, Li, Davis, and Ernst 2005) and near military bases (Graves and 
Peterson 2005; Oron 2005) where low incomes and inelastic demand arguably make loan refinancing 
more likely—reinforces the perception (or demonstrates the reality) that payday lenders practice 
predatory behavior.   
The profitability of payday lenders depends on repeat borrowing.  An Ernst and Young (2004) 
study of 19 payday loan firms in Canada estimated that serving new customers accounts for 85 percent 
payday lender expenses; hence, margins on repeat loans are drastically higher than on new loans.  Using 
data from two large payday lending firms, Flannery and Samolyk (2007) find that “high per-customer 
loan volume” helps payday lenders exploit store-level scale economies as well as offset high loan default   8
rates that account for 21 percent of total operating expenses.
6  These production economics should 
influence payday lenders’ business strategies; in this vein, Stegman and Faris (2003) conclude that 
converting occasional payday borrowers into “chronic” borrowers is an important source of profits for 
payday lenders.  Despite the high incidence of repeat business and the stratospheric APRs, however, there 
is little evidence that payday lending generates excess profits.  Skiba and Tobacman (2007) find that, after 
adjusting for risk, market returns to publicly traded payday loan companies are similar to those of other 
financial firms.  This finding is consistent with low barriers to entry in this industry: the payday loan 
production technology is well known, required financial capital is low (industry data suggest that the 
typical store has only about $100,000 of loans outstanding), and there are very few sunk costs.  Market 
entry may make a competitive difference: Morgan (2007) finds a negative association between payday 
loan prices and the number of payday stores per capita (as well as the number of pawn shops per capita) 
in a cross-section of 37 U.S. cities.   
Careful research on the social welfare effects of payday lending is just beginning, and so far the 
findings are mixed.  Morse (2007) finds that the presence of payday lenders makes local communities 
more resilient to negative economic shocks such as natural disasters.  Morgan (2007) finds that 
economically vulnerable households (those with uncertain income and/or low educational attainment) that 
live in states with unlimited access to payday loans are less likely to be denied credit, no more likely to 
miss loan payments, and no more likely to have high debt levels, when compared to households in other 
states.  Morgan and Strain (2008) find higher incidences of bounced checks, consumer complaints about 
debt collectors, and Chapter 7 bankruptcy filings in states that banned payday lending (Georgia and North 
Carolina) compared to states that allowed payday lending.  Zinman (2008) finds that the tightening of 
payday loan price regulations in Oregon in July 2007 caused a (short-run) deterioration in the overall 
financial conditions of Oregon households.  Melzer (2007) also studies households in Oregon but finds 
harmful effects: households located close to Oregon’s borders with states where access to payday loans is 
                                                 
6 By comparison, in 2007 loan losses at U.S. commercial banks with assets less than $1 billion accounted for only 
about 3 percent of total expenses (based on data from FDIC Reports of Condition and Income).   9
easy experienced higher rates of personal bankruptcy.  Exploiting loan-level data from a single large 
payday loan company, Skiba and Tobacman (2008) also find higher rates of bankruptcy for households 
approved for payday loans; they also find a reduction in pawn broker debt among these households.  
Carrell and Zinman (2008) find “non-trivial” negative effects on job performance and readiness of U.S. 
servicemen with payday debt.   
 
3.  Data 
In Colorado, payday lending is regulated under the Colorado Uniform Consumer Credit Code 
(CUCCC) as modified by the Deferred Deposit Loan Act (DDLA).  The Act defines a “deferred deposit 
loan” as a consumer loan in which the lender advances money to the borrower and in return for a check 
written for the amount of the advance plus a finance charge.  The lender may not cash the check until the 
specified loan term has expired.  Loans cannot be larger than $500, the loan term cannot exceed 40 days, 
and the finance charge is capped at 20% of the loan principal up to $300 and 7.5% of the principal 
amount between $300 and $500.  A loan can be “renewed” only once—although in practice loans can be 
refinanced repeatedly using “same day as payoff” loans in which lenders simply issue new loans to 
refinance existing loans.  Written loan agreements are required, and include the borrower’s name, the 
transaction date, the amount of the loan, the finance charges expressed both in dollars and APR, and the 
following statement in large type: "A deferred deposit loan is not intended to meet long-term financial 
needs.  A deferred deposit loan should be used only to meet short-term cash needs.  Renewing the 
deferred deposit loan rather than paying the debt in full will require additional finance charges.”   
Applicable finance charges must be posted on signage at the point of sale, which is commonly known as a 
“payday store.”   
Every payday loan store must be licensed by the State, whether the store is a free-standing “Mom 
and Pop” business or a branch location of a multi-store payday lending company.  The State Attorney 
General’s Office periodically examines all licensed payday lenders for compliance with the DDLA and 
the CUCCC.  Compliance exams began in July 2000 (shortly after the April 2008 enactment of the   10
DDLA), with most payday stores being examined every one-to-two years.  At each compliance exam, 
information is recorded from the store’s 30 most recent loan transactions, including the amount, finance 
charge, and term of the loan; whether the loan was a new loan, a renewed loan, or a refinanced loan; and 
the frequency of customer borrowing from this lender over the past six-to-twelve months.  This 
compliance exam information forms the core of our data.
7   
The raw compliance exam records contain information on 38,116 payday loans issued between 
July 2000 and December 2006.  We exclude 3,018 loans with incomplete records or outlying values, 
leaving us with 35,098 useful records for our tests.
8  The loans were made in 117 different local markets, 
at 610 licensed payday stores owned by 186 separate payday companies.  Of these 186 payday loan 
companies, 112 were “Mom-and-Pop” companies that operated just a single payday loan store, and 74 
were multi-store companies that operated 498 payday loan stores between them.  These payday loan 
stores operated in just 117 of the 476 Zip code areas in Colorado during our sample period; as discussed 
below, we take measures to control for selection bias potentially caused by the location decisions made by 
payday lenders.   
We use the 5-digit Zip codes of the payday stores to define local geographic markets.  Zip code 
areas are geographically smaller than the city-wide, MSA-wide, or county-wide areas typically used to 
test for competitive effects in banking markets; however, Zip code areas are geographically larger than 
the Census-tract areas typically used to test for demographic phenomena in lending markets.  Thus, we 
are steering a middle ground.  While the Zip code area around the payday store is an imperfect measure of 
local market geography, it has a number of attractive attributes for our purposes.  First, because payday 
borrowers are unlikely to travel long distances to take out such low-value loans, small Zip code areas may 
                                                 
7 In July 2001, examiners began collecting demographic data such as borrower age, gender, martial status, monthly 
income, and length and type of employment.  Unfortunately, these demographic data cannot be merged with the 
pricing data from the compliance exams, because they are drawn from a different sample of loans.  Chessin (2005) 
has studied these demographic data, and finds that the typical Colorado payday borrower is a thirty-six-year-old 
single woman, makes $2,370 per month, and has been employed as a laborer or an office worker for about three and 
one-half years. 
8 Approximately half of the excluded loan records contained incomplete information.  The other half of the excluded 
loan records either (a) had loan principals exceeding legal limits, (b) were made to borrowers with multiple loans at 
the same payday store, and/or (c) had outlying values such as loan principals less than $100, loan terms less than 4 
days or greater than 33 days, or loans with finance charges less than $5.   11
be more appropriate than large Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs).  Second, because efficient scale 
for payday loan stores is relatively small, a Zip code area can support multiple payday loan stores; in our 
data, the average Zip code area was home to 4.14 payday loan stores.  Third, because we do not have 
demographic data for individual borrowers, and must instead observe demographic information at the 
market level, the small Zip code areas provide us with the variation in demographics necessary to test 
neighborhood-effect hypotheses.  Finally, 5-digit Zip codes allow us to merge our payday loan records 
with databases on local demographics (demographic data from the U.S. Census Bureau) and commercial 
bank branches (the Summary of Deposits data from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation).   
These data were collected by the State of Colorado with regulatory purposes in mind, not research 
methodologies, and as such they have a number of shortcomings for our purposes.  First, loan outcomes 
(i.e., whether borrowers repaid, refinanced, or defaulted on their loans) are not included in the data.  
Second, repeat borrowers cannot be tracked across time, because neither borrowers nor their loans are 
tagged with identification numbers.  Third, the lenders are tagged with anonymous lender identification 
numbers, so we cannot link these data to other payday lender databases.  Fourth, there is no information 
about borrower demographics or location in our data, so we must make inferences based on the 
demographics of the ZIP Code areas in which the lenders are located.  Fifth, we observe a sample of the 
loans written by each payday store, not the population of all loans, so we are unable to construct standard 
measures of market share or market concentration.  Despite these imperfections, this remains a unique 
database that spans hundreds of lenders, thousands of borrowers, and scores of local markets; this 
richness provides an opportunity to test a variety of interesting and important hypotheses about payday 
loan pricing.   
3.1. Measuring payday loan prices 
The three chief characteristics of a payday loan are the loan principal in dollars (AMOUNT), the 
maturity of the loan in days (TERM), and fixed finance charge in dollars (CHARGE).  Table 1 reports 
definitions and summary statistics for these three variables.  As discussed above, the usual way to express 
the price of a payday loan is the annual percentage rate (APR), calculated as follows: APR =   12
(CHARGE/AMOUNT)*(365/TERM).  Colorado law places a ceiling on CHARGE (and thus on APR), so 
we also construct two loan pricing measures that reflect this constraint.  BINDING is a dummy variable 
equal to one if CHARGE equals the maximum price allowed under Colorado law, and equal to zero for 
loans that are priced below the legal ceiling.
9  GAP is the difference in dollars between the maximum 
legal price and the actual loan CHARGE, i.e., the pricing discount below the legal maximum.
10  The 
average payday loan in our data had a $314 principal, a $55 finance charge, a 17-day term to maturity, 
and an APR of 452%.  About 94 percent of the loans were priced at the legal ceiling (BINDING=1).  For 
the loans priced below the legal ceiling, the average discount (GAP) to borrowers was $9.31.  The 
definitions and summary statistics for these three loan pricing measures are also reported in Table 1. 
As shown in Figure 1, the distributions of the three pricing measures evolved during the sample 
period.  The percentage of payday loans carrying the maximum legal finance charge (BINDING=1) 
increased systematically from 69 percent in 2000 to 97 percent in 2006; consistent with this, the annual 
mean values of GAP declined from $2.58 to $0.36.  These measures indicate that payday lenders left less 
‘money on the table’ over time.  Moreover, the distributions around both of these mean values grew 
tighter over time.  These are the qualitative patterns one would expect if the regulatory price ceiling was 
serving as a focal point, with payday lenders abandoning price competition and gravitating toward 
deterministic pricing rules over time.  In contrast, the annual mean values of APR did not decline 
systematically over time in a systematic fashion, and the confidence intervals around APR diminish much 
less markedly.  Thus, while APR is the pricing measure most often used in social and regulatory discourse 
concerning payday lending, it does not necessarily capture systematic and meaningful movements in the 
finance charges set by payday lenders. 
 
                                                 
9 In practice, that data suggest that some lenders calculate the highest finance charge allowable under the law for a 
given loan, and then round the actual finance charge up or down to the nearest whole dollar amount.  Because of 
this, we set BINDING=1 if CHARGE is within $.50 (above or below) of the legal maximum price.   
10 Because GAP is likely to increase with the size of the loan, we also constructed a fourth pricing measure %GAP = 
GAP/AMOUNT.  Test results from regressions using %GAP as the dependent variable (results not reported, but are 
available upon request) were very similar, both statistically and economically, to those from regressions in which 
GAP was the dependent variable.    13
4.  Statistical methodology 
The three payday loan pricing measures APR, BINDING and GAP are the dependent variables in 
our regression tests, and each requires a different estimation technique.  For the dummy variable 
BINDING we use logit estimation; for the censored variable GAP we use Tobit estimation; and for the 
two-tailed APR measure we use ordinary least squares.  Note that we use the negative value of GAP in the 
Tobit regressions, so that all three dependent variables increase with loan price.  The data distributions for 
the two continuous pricing measures, GAP and APR, are displayed in Figure 2.  Regardless of estimation 
technique, we specify the baseline regression equation as follows: 
 
loan price  =  f ( non-price loan terms, borrower payday loan history,  
 payday lender characteristics, local market structure,  
 local market demographics, year dummies, month dummies)  +  ε          (1) 
 
where loan prices are observed at the individual loan level and ε is a disturbance term assumed to follow 
the appropriate distribution for the estimation procedure (logit, probit, OLS) at hand.  The variation in the 
data is cross-sectional; although the loans were originated at various points in time between July 2000 and 
December 2006, each loan is observed only once in the data (at origination), which precludes us from 
tracking loans or borrowers across time.  We include year dummies and month dummies to capture, 
respectively, systematic inter-temporal price movements and seasonal price variation.  The right-hand 
side variables are observed variously at the loan level (e.g., non-price loan terms, borrower payday loan 
history), the lender level (e.g., payday lender characteristics), or the local market level (e.g., market 
structure, market demographics).  While our specification of equation (1) is ad hoc, one can think of it as 
a reduced form pricing model in which supply-side influences (e.g., market structure, payday lender 
characteristics) and demand-side influences (e.g., market demographics, borrower payday history) jointly 
determine payday loan prices.  Definitions and summary statistics for the right-hand side variables can be   14
found in Table 2; we discuss these variables, as well as testable hypotheses related to these variables, in 
the section that follows.   
We take two additional steps to improve estimation accuracy and statistical inference.  First, we 
cluster the regression standard errors on both the origination year of the loan and on the payday lending 
firm that made the loan.  The importance of allowing standard errors to vary across time is evident from 
the data displayed in Figure 1.  Allowing regression standard errors to vary across firms is also important, 
because some firms may follow strict pricing rules while others may allow managers pricing discretion.  
Indeed, the data suggest that pricing practices vary considerably across firms: for example, the standard 
deviations of payday loan prices tend to vary substantially more across payday loan firms than within 
payday loan firms.
11  This by-firm, by-year clustering procedure results in 495 separate clusters in the 
full-sample regressions. 
Second, we perform a Heckman correction procedure to control for sample selection bias 
potentially arising from the geographic locations of payday lenders.  Payday lenders are located in only 
117 of the 476 Zip code areas in Colorado; these location decisions undoubtedly depended on local 
market characteristics, some of which (e.g., market demographics) are important test variables in our 
regressions.  An inverse Mills ratio—generated from a binomial probit model estimated across the 476 
Colorado Zip code areas; dependent variable equal to 1 for Zip code areas that contain payday stores, 
equal to 0 otherwise—is included on the right-hand side of equation (1) to control for this selection bias.  
We note that the first-stage probit model is estimated at the market level, while our main test regressions 
(1) are estimated at the loan level.  Additional details regarding the Heckman correction are provided in 
the Appendix; although it is not our intention to perform a full-blown investigation of payday store 
location decisions, the Appendix contains the full results of the probit estimation along with a brief 
discussion of our findings.    
                                                 
11 We made the following calculations for the 172 payday lending firms that reported at least 25 loans in the data:  
The standard deviation of mean BINDING across firms is 0.242, more than twice the average within-firm standard 
deviation of 0.102.  The standard deviation of mean GAP across firms is $2.44, about 80 percent larger than the 
average within-firm standard deviation of $1.37.  The exception is APR, where the across-firm standard deviation is 
91% compared to the average within-firm standard deviation of 156%.     15
 
5.  Variables and hypotheses   
Definitions and summary statistics for the variables used to specify the right-hand side of 
equation (1) are displayed in Table 2.  Some of these variables provide either direct or indirect tests of 
hypotheses related to payday loan pricing strategies (TERM,  LOANS IN YEAR,  SIX MONTHS 
STRAIGHT, NEW CUSTOMER, NEW STORE, MILITARY, %BLACK, %HISPANIC, PAYDAY FIRMS 
PERCAP, MULTIMARKET, MULTISTORE, and the YEAR dummies).  The rest are control variables 
included to absorb systematic variation in payday loan prices unrelated to our strategic pricing hypotheses 
(AMOUNT, INCOME PERHH, POPULATION SHARE, BUSINESSES PERCAP, BRANCHES PERCAP, 
PRIME, and the MONTH dummies).   
Loan-level variables.  The average payday borrower in our data had taken out 9 loans over the 
past year (LOANS IN YEAR) and at the time of loan origination about 11 percent of the borrowers in our 
data had been in payday debt for at least six months (SIX MONTHS STRAIGHT).  The net impact of this 
serial borrowing on payday loan prices is theoretically ambiguous.  Repeat borrowing indicates strong 
demand for payday loans which lenders might exploit by charging higher prices.  Such pricing behavior 
would be reflected in positive coefficients on LOANS IN YEAR, which measures chronic borrowing from 
payday firms in general, and on SIX MONTHS STRAIGHT, which measures chronic repeat borrowing 
from the current payday lender.  On the other hand, serial payday borrowing is possible only if customers 
do not default on the earlier loans, so (ironically) serial borrowers identify themselves as low-credit risk 
customers and as such may pay lower prices that reflect low risk premiums.  Moreover, serial borrowers 
generate the high per-customer loan volumes needed to exploit store-level scale economies (Flannery and 
Samolyk 2007) and payday lenders may shade prices to keep them coming back.   
In contrast, about 41 percent of the loans in our data went to non-repeat customers, i.e., loans not 
used to rollover or refinance a previous loan with the same lender (NEW CUSTOMER).  A negative sign 
on NEW CUSTOMER could indicate that payday lenders offer discounts to attract first-time customers to 
their stores, hoping for the repeat business that is most lucrative in this industry.  To test whether discount   16
pricing strategies are more prevalent in concentrated local markets, where switching costs increase the 
chances of retaining repeat borrowers (Petersen and Rajan 1994), we also estimate an alternative 
regression specification in which NEW CUSTOMER is interacted with PAYDAY FIRMS PERCAP. 
The average loan in our data carried a term of 17 days (TERM) and a $313 loan principal 
(AMOUNT).  Payday loans are discount loans—that is, holding price constant, lender revenue is 
negatively related to loan maturity.  Hence, we expect a positive association between loan prices and 
TERM, as lenders should adjust the finance charge higher for loans that take longer to mature.  We 
include  AMOUNT to control for loan size.  All else equal, larger loans should carry higher finance 
charges, although the convexity of the maximum payday loan pricing schedule in Colorado will dampen 
this positive relationship.  Thus, we expect a negative relationship between loan size and loan prices 
expressed in percentage terms such as APR, but have no a priori expectation for loan prices expressed in 
dollar terms such as GAP.   
Market-level variables.  The average local (Zip code area) Colorado market in which payday 
lenders operated held about 0.7 percent of the total Colorado population (POPULATION SHARE), and the 
average household income in these markets was $41,598 (INCOMEPERHH).  All else equal, demand for 
retail goods and services increases with population; thus, we expect loan prices to increase with 
POPULATION SHARE.  Controlling for population, we expect loan prices to decrease with 
INCOMEPERHH, because payday lending could be considered an inferior good.  About 5% and 21% of 
the populations in these local markets were black (%BLACK) and Hispanic (%HISPANIC), respectively, 
and about 13% of our sample markets were located within 10 miles of a U.S. military base (MILITARY).
12  
Controlling for income levels, the coefficients on %BLACK, %HISPANIC, and MILITARY will reflect the 
joint impact of (a) reduced access to non-payday credit sources in some of these neighborhoods, (b) 
demand inelasticity fostered by reduced access to mainstream credit and/or other intrinsic demand-side 
                                                 
12 The values of these demographic variables are observed from the 2000 U.S. Census; hence, our regression 
estimates will capture variation in loan pricing across local markets but will not capture inter-temporal variation 
across our 2000-2006 time period.  This is unlikely to create serious bias, however, given the relative stickiness of 
demographic data.      17
preferences for payday credit in these neighborhoods, and (c) non-economic price discrimination.  All 
three of these phenomena imply higher payday loan prices.       
The compliance exams from which we draw our data record information on just 30 loans 
regardless of the size of the payday store being examined; as a result, we are unable to construct local 
market shares for payday lending firms.  We measure local market structure by PAYDAY FIRMS 
PERCAP, which equals the number of firms that operate at least one payday store in the local market in a 
given year, scaled by the population in that market.  The average local market contained about 14 payday 
firms per 100,000 persons.  A negative coefficient on this variable is consistent with classical models of 
price competition.  We supplement this measure with MULTIMARKET, which equals the cumulative 
number of local markets (k ≠ j) in which pairs of market j payday firms also compete against each other.  
In a typical local market, pairs of payday firms competed against each other in about 24 other local 
Colorado markets.  A positive coefficient on this variable would suggest that multi-market contact 
dampens competitive rivalry (Tirole 1988, p. 243).   
Two additional variables test whether the local business environment affects payday loan pricing.  
On average, there were approximately 4 business establishments per every 100 persons (BUSINESSES 
PERCAP) and about 4 bank and thrift branches per every 10,000 persons (BRANCHES PERCAP) in the 
local markets in which payday stores operated.  A positive sign on BUSINESSES PERCAP may indicate 
that payday borrowers prefer to do their banking (and thus are willing to pay a higher price) near their 
places of employment.  Similarly, a positive coefficient on BRANCHES PERCAP may indicate that 
payday borrowers prefer to all of their banking (i.e., retail banking and payday borrowing) in a single trip; 
it may also be an indirect reflection of the payday loan production function which requires payday 
borrowers to have checking accounts at banks.   
Lender-level variables.  It is not unusual for newly established retail businesses to offer below-
market prices to attract new customers and establish a clientele.  About 19 percent of the loans in our data 
are observed during payday stores’ initial compliance examinations; NEWSTORE is a dummy variable   18
that indicates those loans.  We expect a negative coefficient on this variable if newly opened payday loan 
stores use such a discount pricing strategy.   
The organizational structure of the Colorado payday loan industry has evolved over time from 
predominantly independent “Mom-and-Pop” payday loan stores (39 percent of the stores our 2000 data) 
to predominantly affiliates of multi-store payday corporations (87 percent of the stores in our 2006 data).  
The two types of stores are likely to exhibit different pricing behaviors.  Because multi-store affiliates are 
essentially branch locations, they are likely to act like revenue centers rather than profit centers, following 
pricing strategies that are dictated by headquarters rather than by local management.  Customers may also 
be willing to pay higher prices for loans at these stores, ceteris paribus, due to actual (better store 
locations, nicer in-store amenities) or perceived (advertising-driven) quality differences.
13  On average, 
about 83 percent of the loans in our data were written at payday stores affiliated with multi-store 
companies; MULTISTORE is a dummy variable that indicates these loans.  The sign of coefficient on this 
variable is theoretically ambiguous: while the revenue-maximization and product-differentiation 
phenomena both predict a positive sign, the potential for scale economies within these larger 
organizations may allow affiliates in multi-store firms to charge lower prices.  To the extent that 
successful product differentiation creates higher franchise value at these firms, multi-store payday lenders 
may be hesitant to pursue pricing strategies that elicit reactions from consumer groups and the press (e.g., 
exploiting price inelastic demand associated with racial status, military status, or the elderly) in order to 
protect that value.  To test for more these and other more subtle pricing differences between multi-store 
affiliates and independent payday loan stores, we also estimate an alternative regression specification in 
which MULTISTORE is interacted with TERM, NEW CUSTOMER, NEW STORE, MILITARY, %BLACK, 
%HISPANIC, PAYDAY FIRMS PERCAP, and MULTIMARKET. 
Time-related and other variables.  Bank loans are a primary source of payday lender finance, 
so we include the U.S. monthly average prime borrowing rate (PRIME) in our regressions and expect a 
                                                 
13 Along these lines, Flannery and Samolyk (2007) characterize payday lending as a monopolistically competitive 
industry.    19
positive coefficient on this variable.  We include a vector of MONTH dummies to control for potential 
seasonality in loan pricing; payday loan production costs are unlikely to be seasonal, so any monthly 
variation in loan prices would be attributed to demand-side phenomena and the potential strategic reaction 
of payday lenders to those phenomena.  We also include a vector of YEAR dummies to absorb variation in 
loan prices across time, and more specifically to test whether the regulated ceiling on payday loan finance 
charges in Colorado has provided payday lenders with a pricing focal point around which to tacitly 
collude (Knittel and Stango, 2003).
14  The following pattern of coefficients would be consistent with 
gravitation toward the regulatory ceiling over time: βYEAR2000 <  βYEAR2001 < …… < βYEAR2004 < βYEAR2005.  
Finally, we include the inverse Mills ratio derived from the Heckman correction procedure (see the 
Appendix for more details) to control for sample selection bias at the local market level.  A statistically 
significant coefficient on MILLS indicates that the correction procedure was necessary, and a positive 
coefficient on MILLS suggests a causal link between unobservable conditions that attract payday lenders 
to certain local markets and unobservable conditions that allow payday lenders to charge higher prices. 
 
6.  Results 
The main regression results are displayed in Table 3.  For ease of interpretation, we multiply the 
dependent variable GAP by -1 so that positive regression coefficients indicate higher loan prices in all the 
regressions, and we report the estimated marginal effects rather than the estimated coefficient values in 
the logit and Tobit regressions.  The regression standard errors are clustered by year and by payday firm 
in all the regressions, resulting in 495 different clusters of observations.  The coefficients on the YEAR 
variables are interpreted relative to the excluded 2006 dummy, and coefficients on the MONTH variables 
are interpreted relative to the exclude January dummy.   
The coefficient on MILLS is statistically significant in all three models, which indicates that the 
first-stage Heckman correction for local market selection bias was a necessary step.  The signs on these 
                                                 
14 There is one piece of circumstantial evidence in the literature consistent with this conjecture: A survey conducted 
by PIRG/CFA (2001) found that the highest payday loan APRs were in states that had usury ceilings.  However, that 
study provided cross sectional evidence, not time series evidence.     20
coefficients imply positive correlations between unobservable conditions that determine the presence of 
payday lenders in a local market and unobservable conditions that determine higher payday loan prices.  
This makes intuitive sense: All else equal, payday lenders will prefer to locate in markets where they can 
charge high loan prices. 
After controlling for a myriad of influences on payday loan prices, the coefficients on the YEAR 
dummies mirror the univariate patterns in Panels A and B of Figure 1.  Compared to payday loans written 
in 2006, payday loans written in 2000 were 34.23% (i.e., 34.23 percentage points) less likely to be priced 
at the legal maximum; in addition, the 2000 loans carried prices that were $4.22 and 34.57 APR basis 
points lower than 2006 loans.  The YEAR coefficients become gradually less negative and approach zero 
over time in both the BINDING and GAP regressions, patterns consistent with the hypothesis that price 
ceilings in Colorado provided a focal point around which payday lenders tacitly colluded to set high 
prices.  However, in the APR regression the movement toward zero is very abrupt, the first of many 
divergent results we find for the APR price variable.   
By definition, tacit collusion leaves no direct evidence; while the estimated YEAR effects found 
here are consistent with pricing focal point theory, they surely do not constitute a smoking gun and can 
arguably be classified as circumstantial evidence.  Hence, it is natural to consider other, non-focal point 
explanations that are also consistent with these YEAR results:  (a) Although we include a number of 
demand-side determinants in the model (e.g., POPULATION SHARE,  INCOMEPERHH,  %BLACK, 
%HISPANIC, MILITARY), our specification may not be completely accounting for growth in payday loan 
demand that put upward pressure on payday loan prices during the 2000-2006 time period.  This seems 
unlikely, however, given the ease of market entry and the rapid growth in the number of licensed payday 
lenders operating in Colorado during the same period.  According to Pfenning (2005), the “growth in the 
number of DDLA licensees has been explosive, with little sign of slowing,” with the population of 
licensed payday lenders more than doubling from 242 in July 2000 to 525 in April 2005.  Moreover, 
PAYDAY FIRMS PERCAP (which we include in the model) increased nearly four-fold during the sample 
period, from 0.058 per thousand persons in 2000 to 0.195 per thousand persons in 2006 for the average   21
local market in which payday stores were located.  (b) Credit risk may have increased over time, forcing 
payday lenders to increase their risk premiums and drive up their loan prices.  But this does not square 
with the increase in refinanced loans (1–NEW CUSTOMER) during the sample period, which increased 
from 39% of all loans made in 2000 to 65% in 2006.  As discussed above, most refinanced or rolled over 
payday loan in Colorado were “same day as payoff” loans—that is, borrowers were establishing 
creditworthiness  via this process—so, if anything, risk premiums and loan prices would have been 
declining on average over time.  (c) Payday firms may have simply been raising their prices while they 
could, ahead of new laws that would constrain prices more tightly—indeed, such a bill narrowly missed 
passing in the Colorado legislature in 2008.  For this “regulatory risk” argument to be valid, however, we 
would expect to observe both an increase in prices and a halt to payday store expansion (i.e., firms tend 
not to increase their investments in declining markets) but this is contrary to the facts stated above. 
We find plentiful evidence consistent with strategic pricing practices, predominantly in the 
BINDING and GAP regressions.
15  On average, the affiliates of multi-store payday firms charged higher 
prices than independent Mom-and-Pop payday stores.  Loans written by multi-store affiliates 
(MULTISTORE) were 4.48% more likely to be priced at the binding legal ceiling, and when priced below 
the ceiling carried prices that were higher by $1.10.  First-time customers (NEW CUSTOMER) enjoyed 
bargains, albeit small ones: their loans were 1.3% less likely to be priced at the legal ceiling, and when 
nonbinding were priced $0.55 lower.  Concentrations of minority residents in local markets (%BLACK, 
%HISPANIC) are associated with small price increases: a 10% increase in black (Hispanic) population in 
a local market increased the probability of a binding loan price by 1.52% (0.99%) and increased the price 
of a nonbinding loan by $0.40 ($0.28).  Interpreting the marginal effects of %BLACK and %HISPANIC is 
difficult given that these variables measure market-level averages and not individual borrower 
characteristics.  While these results are consistent with third-degree price discrimination that raises prices 
in local markets in which demand is likely to be more inelastic, they are also consistent with race-based 
                                                 
15 In the APR regression the coefficients on MULTISTORE, NEW CUSTOMER, %BLACK and %HISPANIC were 
either statistically insignificant or had economically unintuitive signs.   22
price discrimination; in light of the shortcomings of our data, we will presume the former interpretation 
throughout the remainder of this study.   
Indeed, we find additional evidence consistent with the exploitation of inelastic demand.  Payday 
loan stores located close (within 10 miles) to military bases (MILITARY) charged higher prices on 
average: these loans were 2.22% more likely to be priced at the legal maximum, and when priced below 
the maximum were $0.69 and 8.63 APR basis points higher.  In addition, borrowers who repeatedly took 
out loans from the same payday store (SIX MONTHS STRAIGHT) were 1.19% more likely to pay the 
maximum legal price, and for non-binding loans these borrowers paid $0.33 and 23.20 APR basis points 
more than average.   
Markets in which firms practice strategic pricing behavior are unlikely to be competitive markets.  
We find only weak evidence that the presence of additional rivals constrains the level of payday loan 
prices.  The coefficient on PAYDAY FIRMS PERCAP is negative but relatively imprecise in the BINDING 
and GAP regressions; one additional payday lending firm per thousand residents reduces the probability 
of a legally binding price by about 8.23%, and reduces the price of a non-binding loan by (a statistically 
insignificant) $1.91.  The APR regression shows the opposite, and economically unintuitive, result for 
PAYDAY FIRMS PERCAP.   
As expected, payday loan prices are higher in more populous local markets (POPULATION 
SHARE) and in local markets with more places of employment (BUSINESSES PERCAP), though not in 
local markets with more bank branches (BRANCHES PERCAP).  We find little evidence that payday 
lenders passed along higher costs of finance: the coefficient on PRIME is positive as expected but is never 
statistically significant.  However, payday stores did tend to increase prices to pass along a portion of the 
costs of longer maturities (TERM): an additional week increased the probability of a binding loan price by 
1.52% (i.e., 7*0.0016) and increased the price of a nonbinding loan by $0.36.
16  (By construction, APR 
                                                 
16 This price increase offsets only a small fraction of the lost revenue from less frequent loan refinancings.   
Increasing the loan term by 7 days, from the sample average of 17 days to 24 days, reduces the potential number of 
loans from about 21 loans per year to about 15 loans per year.  Assuming the customer repeatedly refinances her 
loan for an entire year, payday lender revenue declines by roughly $325 per year ($55*6 - $0.36*15).     23
declines with both TERM and AMOUNT.
17)  We find no sensible associations between loan prices and 
household income (INCOME PERHH); the significantly negative coefficient on this variable in the APR 
regression is unintuitive.  Finally, there is no strong evidence in support of the strategic pricing 
hypotheses relating seasonal loan pricing (MONTH dummies), discounted loan prices at newly opened 
payday stores (NEW STORE),  high volume payday lenders (LOANS IN YEAR), or multimarket contact 
(MULTIMARKET).   
6.1. Strategic pricing by time period 
As time passed during our sample period, both BINDING and GAP became more tightly 
distributed around mean values that were closer to their regulatory constraints (see Figure 1).  To test 
whether various pricing behaviors became more or less prevalent as finance charges converged toward the 
regulatory ceiling, we re-estimated the pricing models for early (2000-2003) and later (2004-2006) 
subsamples.  Table 4 displays the results of these regressions.  In general, the data indicate a reduction in 
competitive pricing pressure over time, with an increase in strategic and/or exploitative pricing behavior 
arising in its place. 
There is evidence consistent with classical price competition in the early subsample.  Prior to 
2004, an additional payday firm per thousand residents (PAYDAY FIRMS PERCAP) reduces the 
probability of a legally binding price by about 22.61%, and reduces the price of a non-binding loan by 
$4.59.  These economically substantial pricing effects disappear entirely in the later subsample, however, 
and we find increased evidence of strategic pricing in this newly non-competitive environment.  First-
time customer discounts (NEW CUSTOMER) are statistically significant only in the post-2003 subsample, 
when loans to new customers were 1.55% less likely to be binding and non-binding loan prices were 
$0.96 lower.  The GAP regression estimates suggest that payday lenders exploited demand inelasticity 
                                                 
17 We estimated the APR regression after excluding the right-hand side TERM and AMOUNT variables, since these 
two variables are used to construct APR.  The results (not shown here, available upon request) were similar to those 
shown in Table 3.   24
(MILITARY, %BLACK, %HISPANIC) to a greater degree after 2003 than in the earlier years.
18  And the 
price differences between multi-store affiliates and independent stores emerge only in the post-2003 data, 
when multi-store affiliates (MULTISTORE) became 4.03% more likely than independents to price at the 
regulatory ceiling, and set their finance charges $1.41 higher for loans priced below the ceiling.  As in the 
full-sample regressions, the coefficients in the APR regressions follow entirely different, and often 
unintuitive, patterns. 
In contrast, some pricing results disappear over time.  On average, payday lenders stopped 
charging higher prices to their long-term repeat borrowers (SIX MONTHS STRAIGHT) after 2003, and 
also abandoned their practice of charging higher finance charges in exchange for longer refinancing 
intervals (TERM).  As suggested above (e.g., footnote 15), experience may have proved these practices to 
be unprofitable.  We also observe a substantial seasonal pricing effect prior to 2004, but not after.  The 
average payday loan written in January—presumably when holiday bills generated a strong demand for 
payday advances—was between 15.11% and 21.41% more likely to carry a the maximum legal price, and 
non-binding loans were between $1.75 and $2.61 more expensive, compared to prices in the other eleven 
months.  Why lenders abandoned this seasonal pricing pattern is open to conjecture; the answer may lie in 
the primacy of long-term relationships for payday lender profitability (Stegman and Faris 2003, Flannery 
and Samolyk 2007) and the reactions of repeat customers who feel that they are being held up when they 
need credit the most.  A repeat customer can observe such seasonal price discrimination, while it is 
difficult for local borrowers to detect spatial price discrimination (MILITARY, %BLACK, %HISPANIC) 
because they cannot compare their prices to those charged in other local markets.   
While we have thus far interpreted negative coefficient estimates on NEW CUSTOMER as 
evidence of a simple strategy of discounts for first-time borrowers, this result may also be consistent with 
a more complex pricing strategy predicted and observed by Petersen and Rajan (1994) for small business 
                                                 
18 In the BINDING regressions the marginal impact of MILITARY becomes statistically stronger post-2003, but the 
marginal effects of %BLACK  and  %HISPANIC become economically smaller.  The latter result likely occurs 
because 96% of the loans in the 2004-2006 subsample were written at the maximum price ceiling, leaving very little 
room in the logit estimation for upside marginal influence.     25
loans.  In this strategy, a lender with local market power offers low loan prices (interest rates and fees) to 
new small business customers, but then exploits these borrowers’ switching costs by charging higher 
prices on subsequent loans.  The costs of switching to a new lender are high in this scenario for two 
reasons: (a) it is costly for informationally opaque small businesses to re-establish their creditworthiness 
with new lenders and (b) there are few alternative lenders.  Payday borrowers also face information-based 
switching costs; Stegman (2007) reports that initiating a new payday credit relationship “can take less 
than an hour,” so roughly, if an hour of the borrower’s time is worth more than the discounted expected 
stream of increased or above-market service charges on future loan refinancings, then switching costs will 
keep the borrower in place.
19  To test whether market power better allows payday lenders to take 
advantage of this pricing strategy, we re-estimated our pre-2004 and post-2003 pricing models with the 
interaction term NEW CUSTOMER*PAYDAY FIRMS PERCAP included on the right-hand side.  A 
positive coefficient on this term would indicate that increased market power (i.e., fewer payday firms per 
capita) is associated with larger discounts to first-time borrowers, consistent with the dynamic 
relationship pricing behavior posited by Petersen and Rajan (1994). 
The results are displayed in Table 5.  As before, we focus on the results from the BINDING and 
GAP regressions.  During the early years there is no evidence of this pricing strategy; increased market 
power (i.e., lower PAYDAY FIRMS PERCAP) is associated with higher loan prices for both first-time and 
repeat customers, but on average first-time customers pay the same prices as repeat borrowers.  During 
the later years, however, we find strong statistical evidence consistent with dynamic relationship pricing 
in which discounts for first-time borrowers increase with lender market power.  For example, first-time 
customers with the fewest competitive choices (i.e., local markets in the 1
st percentile of the PAYDAY 
FIRMS PERCAP distribution) were 2.28 percent less likely to face binding prices and on average saved 
$1.34 on that initial loan.  But these discounts became less likely and shrank in size as local market 
                                                 
19 This is quite plausible given the small dollar amounts involved with payday loans, the high likelihood that payday 
borrowers underestimate the number of times they will have to refinance their loans, the short time periods over 
which the discounting occurs, and the reasonable assumption that the location of any alternative payday lender is 
less convenient for the borrower.           26
structure became more competitive.  For example, for local markets in the 90
th percentile of the PAYDAY 
FIRMS PERCAP distribution, first-time customers were just 1.26 percent less likely to face binding prices 
and saved just $0.67 on that initial loan.
20   
6.2. Strategic pricing by firm type 
We have shown that payday stores owned by multi-store firms were substantially more likely to 
set legally binding finance charges than independent stores, and also charged substantially higher finance 
charges for non-binding loans (see Table 3).  To test whether multi-store firms were more or less likely 
than independent stores to practice various types of strategic pricing, we estimated new versions of the 
full-sample models that included interactions between MULTISTORE and the strategic pricing variables.  
Partial results from these regressions are displayed in Table 6.   
We find several instances of divergent pricing practices.  Independent payday stores charged 
higher loan prices near military bases, but similarly located multi-store payday lenders did not.  For the 
independent stores, prices near military bases were 4.8% more likely to be binding, and for non-binding 
loans prices averaged $2.21 and 48 APR basis points higher.  (The significantly negative coefficients on 
the  MULTI*MILITARY variable essentially negate the independent store effects, as indicated by the 
statistically zero coefficient sums MILITARY +  MULTI*MILITARY.)  The results suggest that 
independent stores exploited inelastic demand in these markets while the larger firms did not, a result 
likely to surprise some payday lending critics.  With more franchise value at stake (both inside and 
outside Colorado), the multi-store lenders may have wished to avoid charges of price discrimination 
regarding this very popular, high-profile customer group.  We find similar though weaker results for loans 
in minority neighborhoods: both independents and multi-stores charged higher prices in heavily Hispanic 
markets, but the point estimates for the independent lenders are about twice as big (although this 
difference is not statistically significant).  Multi-store lenders were 2.8% more likely than independents to 
charge legally binding prices to in-house chronic borrowers (MULTI*SIX MONTHS STRAIGHT) and 
                                                 
20 We also estimated this interaction specification for the full data sample (not shown, available upon request) and 
the results were qualitatively similar to, though quantitatively weaker than, the post-2003 results.   27
charged these borrowers $1.08 more than did independents for non-binding loans.  Multi-store lenders 
were also more likely to adjust finance charges upward for longer term loans (MULTI*TERM) and less 
likely to charge higher prices to chronic payday borrowers (MULTI*LOANS IN YEAR), although the 
economic magnitudes of these last two phenomena are immaterial.   
 
7.  Conclusions 
In recent years, payday loans have become a more important source of credit for U.S. households, 
and payday lenders have been increasingly criticized for charging high prices to financially 
unsophisticated and vulnerable consumers.  While academic, regulatory, and industry studies have 
thoroughly documented the high absolute levels of payday loan prices, almost no attention has been paid 
to the relative differences in payday loan prices across borrowers, lenders, and local markets; the manner 
in which payday lenders arrive at these prices; or the impact of government regulation on payday lender 
pricing practices.  To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to systematically analyze the 
determinants of payday loan prices.  We examine the pricing patterns of payday lenders in Colorado 
between July 2000 and December 2006, using a variety of estimation techniques to account for potential 
biases introduced by regulatory price ceilings, payday store location choices, differences in pricing 
cultures across payday lenders, and changes in the payday loan pricing environment over time. 
Even a cursory look at these data reveals a strong relationship between actual payday loan prices 
and the payday loan price ceiling imposed by the Colorado legislature in April 2000.  With the passage of 
time, the average finance charge on payday loans has gravitated upwards toward this ceiling, and the 
variation in finance charges across payday loans has diminished.  These patterns are consistent with 
Schelling’s (1960) theory of implicit collusion around pricing focal points, and are quite similar to those 
observed by Knittel and Stango (2003) regarding state-imposed credit card interest rate ceilings.  Of 
course, these patterns do not by themselves comprise definitive evidence of focal point pricing—such is 
the nature of implicit collusion—and in any event implicit collusion is difficult to prosecute under U.S.   28
antitrust laws given the absence of a “smoking gun” (Scherer and Ross, 1990).  The irony that these 
alleged collusive focal points were provided by state legislatures is worth noting, however.   
Putting aside any allusions to anti-competitive behavior, we nonetheless do find evidence of non-
competitive outcomes.  As the average payday loan price moved closer to the regulatory ceiling over 
time, the data indicate that competitive pricing pressure dissipated and strategic pricing behaviors 
emerged.  Initially (2000-2003), loan prices were lower in markets with greater numbers of payday 
lenders, but this evidence of competitive pricing pressure fades later on (2004-2006).  In its place we find 
evidence of two types of strategic pricing.  The later data contain stronger evidence of third-degree price 
discrimination: loan prices were higher in neighborhoods near military bases and in disproportionately 
minority neighborhoods, consistent with exploitation of price inelasticity among these demographic 
groups.  The later data also contain stronger evidence of dynamic relationship pricing:  first-time 
borrowers pay lower prices than refinancing borrowers, especially in highly concentrated local markets, 
consistent with exploitation of borrower switching costs (Petersen and Rajan 1994). 
The organizational form of payday lenders also turns out to be an important determinant of 
payday loan prices.  Loan prices were systematically higher at payday loan stores affiliated with multiple-
location companies, and conformed more closely to certain strategic pricing behaviors.  Compared to 
independent Mom-and-Pop payday stores, multi-store firms were more likely to charge lower prices to 
new customers (higher prices to refinancing customers) and more likely to adjust finance charges upward 
for longer term loans.  Perhaps most interestingly, multi-store firms tended to charge lower prices near 
military bases and in minority neighborhoods than independent lenders; with more franchise value at risk 
than the Mom-and-Pops, these firms may have incentives to avoid pricing behaviors likely to attract 
public criticism.  Thus, our data suggest that demographic-based price discrimination is chiefly a pricing 
characteristic of stand-alone payday stores, which represent a decreasing portion of this market. 
In the politically charged environment of payday lending, evidence or even suggestion of price 
discrimination can incite outrage by consumer groups and trigger legislative or regulatory reprisals—most 
especially when the pricing differences are associated with demographic phenomena.  In December 2006   29
the U.S. Congress capped APRs on unsecured personal loans to military personnel at 36%; the legislation 
was a direct reaction to increasing concentrations of payday loan stores near military bases and an 
increasing payday debt burden among military personnel.  Several states have recently passed laws that 
ended payday lending outright (e.g., Georgia in 2004) or imposed severe limitations on payday loan 
prices (e.g., Oregon in 2006).  In Colorado, a 2006 study by the Attorney General’s Office on the growth 
of payday lending and subsequent anti-payday lending newspaper editorials led to reform legislation in 
2007; the bill required payday lenders to offer fourth-time repeat borrowers the opportunity to convert 
their loan to a payment plan.  Additional legislation that would have limited payday loan APRs to 45% in 
Colorado died in committee in 2008.    
In the ongoing public debate, payday lenders are criticized mainly on two grounds: providing 
misleading or incomplete information to borrowers and charging borrowers high prices.  The nugget of 
information most often used in discussions of payday loan prices is the annual percentage rate, or APR.  
However, when we use the APR to measure payday loan prices in our regression tests, we obtain weak 
and economically unintuitive results.  This troubling result suggests that new payday price metrics should 
be developed that more accurately reflect market pricing behaviors.  Related to this, our regression results 
indicate that competition among payday lenders can exert downward pricing pressure in non-collusive 
local markets.  Additional price competition could be introduced by reversing de facto federal regulation 
that prohibits banks and thrifts from offering payday loans.  Bair (2005) concludes that banks are reticent 
to offer low-cost short-term consumer credit because it would cannibalize their profitable overdraft 
protection products; however, there are anecdotal exceptions among depository institutions not currently 
banned from payday lending.
21  Moreover, offering payday loans where the regulatory light shines the 
brightest would provide consumers with greater protection and, as suggested by the results of our 
                                                 
21 Some state-chartered credit unions are not banned from payday lending, and there are instances in which these 
firms are offering payday loans at prices substantially below regulated price ceilings.  For example, the Credit Union 
of Dodge City in Kansas offers payday loans for a $10 fee per $100 borrowed, one-third lower than the state payday 
lending ceiling of $15.     30
regression tests, the high franchise value of lenders with valuable state or federal charters would reduce 
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Table 1:  Summary statistics for payday loan pricing variables and their components.  Data for 35,098 payday loans originated in Colorado 
between July 2000 and December 2008.    
 
 
Variable Definition  Mean  Standard 
Deviation Minimum Median Maximum
AMOUNT  Loan principal in dollars.  313.68  127.71  100.00  300.00  500.00 
CHARGE  Loan finance charge in dollars.  54.96  17.41  5.00  60.00  75.00 
TERM  Loan term in days.  16.8380  6.6216  4.0000  14.0000  33.0000 
APR  Annual percentage rate (%).  451.61 180.53  39.25  439.96 1825.00 
BINDING  = 1 if finance charge is set at the 
regulatory maximum.   0.9362 0.2445  0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
GAP  Legal maximum finance charge minus 
actual finance charge.  0.59 3.05  0.00 0.00 50.00 
GAP (BINDING=0)  GAP for the 2,241 loans with finance 
charges less than the regulatory maximum.  9.31 8.02  0.50 8.00 50.00 
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Table 2:  Definitions and summary statistics for right-hand side variables in the payday loan pricing regressions.  Data for 35,098 payday loans 
originated in Colorado between July 2000 and December 2008.    
 
Variable Definition  Mean  Standard 
Deviation Minimum Median Maximum 
Loan-level variables           
AMOUNT  Loan principal in dollars.  313.68  127.71  100.00  300.00  500.00 
TERM   Loan term in days.  16.84  6.62  4  14  33 
NEW CUSTOMER  = 1 if borrower is not refinancing a previous loan.   0.4154  0.4928  0  0  1 
LOANS IN YEAR  Number of payday loans borrower has taken out from all 
sources during previous 12 months.  9.2318 7.2545  1  7  69 
SIX MONTHS STRAIGHT  = 1 if borrower has been in debt to current payday lender 
continuously for the past six months.  0.1139 0.3177  0  0  1 
Market-level variables           
%BLACK  Percentage of local market population that is black.  0.0525  0.0703  0.0007  0.0180  0.4449 
%HISPANIC  Percentage of local market population that is Hispanic.  0.2126  0.1393  0.0280  0.1498  0.6667 
MILITARY  = 1 if payday lender is located within 10 miles of a U.S. military 
base.  0.1319 0.3383  0  0  1 
INCOME PERHH   Income per household in local market in $1,000.  41.5979 9.2987  24.7710  39.5240  86.3560 
POPULATION SHARE  Percentage of Colorado population that lives in the local market.  0.73  0.30  0.08  0.76  1.39 
MULTIMARKET  Cumulative number of local markets (k ≠ j) in which pairs of 
market j payday firms compete against each other.  24.0859 28.9906 0.0000  14.6667  132.0000 
PAYDAY FIRMS PERCAP   Number of payday firms per 1,000 persons in local market.   0.1415  0.1214  0.0167  0.1152  0.9166 
BUSINESSES PERCAP  Number of business establishments per person in local market.  0.0417  0.0742  0.0087 0.0307 0.6785 
BRANCHES PERCAP  Number of bank branches per 1,000 persons in local market. 0.4275  0.8411  0.0330  0.2685  8.2493 
Lender-level variables           
MULTISTORE  = 1 if payday loan store is an affiliate in a multi-store payday 
lending company.  0.8260 0.3791  0  1  1 
NEW STORE  = 1 if first ever compliance for payday loan store.  0.1858  0.3889  0  0  1 
Other variables           
MILLS  Inverse Mills ratio (see Appendix for details). 0.2582  0.3830  0.0000 0.0987 2.3551 
PRIME  Prime lending rate (%).  5.7670  1.6092  4.00  5.25  9.50 
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Table 3:  Full sample regression results for the payday loan pricing model (1), estimated using logit, 
Tobit, and ordinary least squares techniques.  Data for 35,098 payday loans originated in Colorado 
between July 2000 and December 2008.  Cells contain marginal effects (except for the constant term).  
Superscripts *, **, and *** indicate a statistical difference from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of 
significance.  Clustered standard errors in all regressions are allowed to vary with the payday loan firm 
and with the year of loan origination, resulting in 495 separate data clusters.  All variables defined in 
Table 2.  
 
 [1]  [2]  [3] 
estimation technique:  logit  Tobit  OLS 
dependent variable:  BINDING -GAP  APR 
MILLS  0.0867 *** 2.4218 *** 0.1304 ** 
D2000  -0.3423 * -4.2162 **  -0.3457  ** 
D2001  -0.1084  -1.7935 **  0.0228   
D2002  -0.0313  -0.6212  0.0534   
D2003  -0.0096  -0.0872  0.0889   
D2004  -0.0012   0.1817   0.0880  
D2005  -0.0064   0.0583   0.0513  
MULTISTORE  0.0448 *** 1.1008 *** 0.0075  
NEW STORE  -0.0059  -0.2640  -0.0658   
NEW CUSTOMER  -0.0130 ** -0.5501 *** 0.1979  *** 
MILITARY  0.0222 **  0.6915 *  0.0863 ** 
%BLACK  0.1518 *** 3.9948 *** -0.0114  
%HISPANIC  0.0989 *** 2.8067 *** -0.1108  
PAYDAY FIRMS PERCAP -0.0823 * -1.9078   0.2450  * 
MULTIMARKET  -0.0002  -0.0037  -0.0007  * 
TERM  0.0016 *** 0.0517 *** -0.2206 *** 
M2  0.0059   0.1579   -0.0782  
M3  0.0099   0.3612   -0.0338  
M4  0.0069   0.1788   -0.0593  
M5  0.0192 *  0.6375   -0.0425  
M6  0.0067   0.2296   -0.0426  
M7  0.0083   0.1045   -0.0130  
M8  0.0048   0.1734   -0.0511  
M9  0.0214 *  0.7777 *  -0.0426  
M10  0.0289 *** 1.1142 **  0.0009  
M11  0.0135   0.3994   -0.0643  
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Table 3:  Continued from previous page. 
 
 [1]  [2]  [3] 
estimation technique:  logit  Tobit  OLS 
dependent variable:  BINDING -GAP  APR 
PRIME  0.0054   0.1789   0.0113  
LOANS IN YEAR  -0.0001   -0.0044   -0.0152 *** 
SIX MONTHS STRAIGHT  0.0119 **  0.3313 **  0.2320 *** 
AMOUNT  0.0000   0.0002   -0.0039  *** 
INCOME PERHH  0.0001   0.0004   -0.0039  ** 
POPULATION SHARE  0.0829 *** 2.1279 *** 0.3025 *** 
BUSINESSES PERCAP  0.2807 *  7.6113 *  0.3051  
BRANCHES PERCAP  0.0128   0.2162   -0.0136   
constant -1.8703    -10.6870    9.3179   
            
N 35,098    35,098    35,098   
R-square         0.7201   
pseudo-R-square 0.1270    0.0651       
censored observations      32,857         38
Table 4:  Sub-sample regression results (2000-2003 vs. 2004-2006) for the payday loan pricing model 
(1), estimated using logit, Tobit, and ordinary least squares techniques.  Data for 35,098 payday loans 
originated in Colorado between July 2000 and December 2008.  Cells contain marginal effects (except for 
the constant term).  Superscripts *, **, and *** indicate a statistical difference from zero at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels of significance.  Clustered standard errors in all regressions are allowed to vary with the 
payday loan firm and with the year of loan origination.  All variables defined in Table 2.  
 
 
 [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6] 
Sub-sample: 2000-2003  2004-2006 
estimation technique:  Logit  Tobit  OLS  Logit  Tobit  OLS 
dependent variable:  BINDING -GAP  APR BINDING -GAP  APR 
MILLS  0.1223  *** 2.5875 *** 0.3534 ***  0.0509  *** 2.3283 *** -0.0164   
D2000  -0.2227   -3.0484  -0.5073              
D2001  -0.0855   -1.4309  -0.0806              
D2002  -0.0233   -0.4603  -0.0182              
D2004          0.0521    3.6331    0.3766   
D2005          0.0249    1.8301    0.1923   
MULTISTORE  0.0438   0.8617  *  -0.0004   0.0403  **  1.4124  ***  0.0271  
NEW STORE  0.0004   -0.0987  -0.1093   -0.0093   -0.4678  -0.0085  
NEW CUSTOMER  -0.0064   -0.2668  0.2207  ***  -0.0155  ***  -0.9628  ***  0.1832  *** 
MILITARY  0.0251   0.5276  0.1556  * 0.0158  ***  1.0292  ***  0.0401  
%BLACK  0.1864  * 3.1726 * 0.0258    0.1019 ** 4.8319 **  -0.0272   
%HISPANIC  0.1329 **  2.4470  **  -0.2912  * 0.0596 ** 3.3188  ***  -0.0021  
PAYDAY FIRMS PERCAP  -0.2261  **  -4.5947  **  0.3114   0.0056  1.0547  0.2476  ** 
MULTIMARKET  -0.0003   -0.0048  -0.0010   -0.0001  -0.0015  -0.0006  * 
TERM  0.0040  *** 0.0867 ***  -0.2315  ***  0.0002    0.0224    -0.2144 *** 
M2  -0.0473   -0.6027  -0.1761   0.0004   -0.0369  -0.0378  
M3  -0.1511 *  -1.7519  *  -0.2493   0.0103 * 0.6738   0.0641   
M4  -0.2141 **  -2.6111  ***  -0.2611   0.0139 ** 0.9208  * 0.0160   
M5  -0.1563 *  -1.8718  **  -0.1787   0.0167  ***  1.1238  **  -0.0136  
M6  -0.2119  **  -2.4263  ***  -0.2363   0.0114  0.6915  0.0148  
M7  -0.1430  -1.9177  *  0.0104  -0.0042  -0.3097  -0.0991  
M8  -0.1692 *  -2.0148  **  -0.1836  -0.0030  -0.2166  -0.0455  
M9  -0.0907   -1.0849  -0.1477   0.0055    0.1445   -0.0599  
M10  -0.0897   -1.1575  -0.0796   0.0213  ***  1.5957 *  -0.0438  
M11  -0.1569   -1.9717  *  -0.1340   -0.0036  -0.2908  -0.1366  
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Table 4:  Continued from previous page. 
 
 
 [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6] 
Sub-sample: 2000-2003  2004-2006 
estimation technique:  Logit  Tobit  OLS  Logit  Tobit  OLS 
dependent variable:  BINDING -GAP  APR BINDING -GAP  APR 
PRIME  -0.0050   -0.0504  0.0289   0.0208    1.2452   0.0902   
LOANS IN YEAR  -0.0005   -0.0104  -0.0128  ***  -0.0001  -0.0034  -0.0164  *** 
SIX MONTHS STRAIGHT  0.0238  ***  0.5515  **  0.2245  ***  0.0031  0.1200  0.2335  *** 
AMOUNT  0.0000   -0.0002  -0.0037  ***  0.0000    0.0008   -0.0040  *** 
INCOME PERHH  -0.0002   -0.0156  -0.0107  ***  0.0002    0.0159   0.0001   
POPULATION SHARE  0.1202 **  2.3091  **  0.6573  ***  0.0491 ** 2.1011 **  0.0492   
BUSINESSES PERCAP  0.5488   7.9373  0.2384   0.1710 * 9.2494 *  0.0020  
BRANCHES PERCAP  0.0303   0.5160  0.0243  -0.0047  -0.3396  -0.0141  
constant  0.9881   13.3849  9.5077  -10.1636  -95.6067   8.6660   
                 
N  14,103   14,103  14,103   20,995  20,995  20,995  
R-square        0.6747          0.7570   
pseudo-R-square  0.1186   0.0552       0.1541   0.0813      
censored  observations     12,682          20,175      
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Table 5:  Selected sub-sample regression results (2000-2003 vs. 2004-2006) for the payday loan pricing model (1), augmented to include NEW 
CUSTOMER * PAYDAY FIRMS PERCAP interaction term, estimated using logit, Tobit, and ordinary least squares techniques.  Data for 35,098 
payday loans originated in Colorado between July 2000 and December 2008.  Cells contain marginal effects.  Superscripts *, **, and *** indicate 
a statistical difference from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance.  Clustered standard errors in all regressions are allowed to vary 




  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Sub-sample: 2000-2003  2004-2006 
estimation  technique:  Logit Tobit OLS Logit Tobit OLS 
dependent variable:  BINDING -GAP  APR  BINDING -GAP  APR 
NEW CUSTOMER  -0.0021   -0.3441   0.2282 ***  -0.0238 ***  -1.4073 ***  0.1771 *** 
PAYDAY FIRMS PERCAP  -0.2072 **  -4.9032 **  0.3373   -0.0162   -0.3453   0.2332 * 
NEW CUSTOMER * PAYDAY FIRMS PERCAP  -0.0372   0.6571   -0.0575   0.0463 **  3.0542 **  0.0418  
                   
∂(·) / ∂PAYDAY FIRMS PERCAP, evaluated at        -0.2444  ***  -4.2461  **  0.2798    0.0301    2.7089    0.2750   
   NEW CUSTOMER  =   1 .                    
                   
∂(·) / ∂NEW CUSTOMER,  evaluated  at                   
PAYDAY FIRMS PERCAP percentiles:           1%  -0.0029    -0.3304   0.2270 ***  -0.0228 ***  -1.3435 ***  0.1780 *** 
10%  -0.0038   -0.3137   0.2255 ***  -0.0217 ***  -1.2659 ***  0.1790 *** 
25%  -0.0048   -0.2962   0.2240 ***  -0.0204 ***  -1.1846 ***  0.1801 *** 
50%  -0.0064   -0.2684   0.2216 ***  -0.0185 ***  -1.0555 ***  0.1819 *** 
75%  -0.0083   -0.2344   0.2186 ***  -0.0161 ***  -0.8972 ***  0.1841 *** 
90%  -0.0111   -0.1847   0.2143 ***  -0.0126 ***  -0.6664 ***  0.1872 *** 
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Table 6:  Selected full sample regression results for the payday loan pricing model (1) augmented to 
include interaction terms, estimated using logit, Tobit, and ordinary least squares techniques.  Data for 
35,098 payday loans originated in Colorado between July 2000 and December 2008.  Cells contain 
marginal effects.  Superscripts *, **, and *** indicate a statistical difference from zero at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels of significance.  Clustered standard errors in all regressions are allowed to vary with the 
payday loan firm and with the year of loan origination.  All variables defined in Table 2.  
 
 
 [1]  [2]  [3] 
estimation technique:  logit  Tobit  OLS 
dependent variable:  BINDING -GAP  APR 
NEW STORE  0.0137    0.4064    0.1226   
MULTISTORE*NEW STORE  -0.0386    -1.0156    -0.2674 ** 
sum  -0.0249    -0.6091    -0.1448 ** 
NEW CUSTOMER  -0.0035    -0.3050    0.1124 ***
MULTISTORE*NEW CUSTOMER  -0.0137    -0.3472    0.1017 * 
sum -0.0171 **  -0.6522 ***  0.2141 ***
MILITARY  0.0477 *** 2.2095 *** 0.4796 ** 
MULTISTORE*MILITARY  -0.1779 * -2.9350 **  -0.4459 ** 
sum  -0.1302    -0.7255    0.0337   
%BLACK  0.1761    4.4107    -0.3731   
MULTISTORE*%BLACK  -0.0411    -0.6598    0.3264   
sum 0.1350 *** 3.7509 ***  -0.0467    
%HISPANIC  0.1406 ** 4.0530 **  -0.2064    
MULTISTORE*%HISPANIC  -0.0673    -1.7946    0.1061   
Sum 0.0733 **  2.2583 **  -0.1003    
PAYDAY FIRMS PERCAP  -0.1095    -2.9584    0.6757 ***
MULTISTORE*PAYDAY FIRMS PERCAP  0.0477    1.4952    -0.5563 ** 
sum  -0.0618    -1.4632    0.1194   
MULTIMARKET  -0.0004    -0.0123    0.0018   
MULTISTORE*MULTIMARKET  0.0003    0.0118    -0.0027   
sum  -0.0001    -0.0005    -0.0009 ** 
TERM  0.0005    0.0193    -0.2244 ***
MULTISTORE*TERM  0.0017 ** 0.0503 ** 0.0041    
sum 0.0022 *** 0.0695 ***  -0.2203 ***
LOANS THIS YEAR  0.0012 *  0.0273    -0.0080   
MULTISTORE*LOANS THIS YEAR  -0.0020 ** -0.0448 *  -0.0086    
sum -0.0007 **  -0.0175     -0.0166 ***
SIX MONTHS STRAIGHT  -0.0194    -0.5869 *  0.2211 ***
MULTISTORE*SIX MONTHS STRAIGHT  0.0280 *** 1.0820 *** 0.0134    
sum 0.0086 *** 0.4951 ***  0.2345 ***
     
N  35,098  35,098  35,098  
R-square     0.7219  
pseudo-R-square  0.1440  0.0729    
censored observations   32,857    
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Figure 2: Histograms for continuous pricing variables. 
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Appendix: Payday Store Location  
During our 2000-2006 sample period, payday lenders operated in only 117 of the 476 Zip code 
areas in Colorado.  If conditions in these 117 markets differ systematically from conditions in the 359 
markets without payday loan stores, then we must admit to the possibility that location choice could be 
introducing estimation bias into our payday loan pricing model (1).  Arguably, payday lenders will prefer 
to locate in markets where incomes are relatively low (INCOME PERHH), where large numbers of 
workers receive or deposit their paychecks (BUSINESSES PERCAP, BRANCHES PERCAP), or where 
some residents lack full access to mainstream credit sources (MILITARY, %BLACK, %HISPANIC)—all 
variables that appear on the right-hand side of our pricing model.  Consequently, the decision by payday 
lenders to operate in certain Zip Code areas will not be random, causing the residual in equation (1) to be 
systematically correlated with these right-hand side variables, biasing the coefficient estimates.   
We describe here the Heckman correction procedure we used to neutralize any such selection 
bias.  We estimate that following binomial probit equation: 
 
Prob(payday store in market)  =  Φ (POPULATION SHARE, %BLACK, %HISPANIC, MILITARY, 
                 INCOME PERHH, HOUSE VALUE, URBAN,  
                 BUSINESSES PERCAP, BRANCHESPERCAP)   +   η                      (2) 
 
where all of the variables have been defined above except:  HOUSE VALUE is the mean value of homes 
in the local Zip code market, URBAN is a dummy equal to one if the local market lies within a 
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), and η is a normally distributed disturbance term.  The inverse-Mills 
ratio (MILLS) is derived from the estimated results of (2), using the standard methods (Heckman 1979), 
and is included on the right-hand side of our pricing model (1).  In the pricing model, a positive (negative) 
and significant coefficient on MILLS would indicate a positive (negative) correlation between   45
unobservable conditions that determine payday lender market presence and unobservable conditions that 
allow payday lenders to charge higher prices. 
Table A.1 displays the estimated probit results.  The data indicate that payday lenders are 
attracted to densely populated areas (POPULATION SHARE) with lots of business and banking activity 
(BUSINESSES PERCAP, BRANCHES PERCAP).  Consistent with legislative concern about the targeting 
of military personnel, we find some evidence that payday lenders are attracted to markets nearby to 
military bases (MILITARY).  We find no evidence that payday lenders are attracted to minority 
neighborhoods (%BLACK, %HISPANIC); however, payday lenders are attracted lower household income 
areas (INCOME PERHH) which are likely to contain higher concentrations of minority households.  The 
statistically significant results for INCOME PERHH and BRANCHES PERCAP are consistent with the 
findings of Damar (2006), while the non-significant result for %HISPANIC is not.        
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Table A.1:  Probit estimation based on 476 Zip-code level observations.  Results used to construct the 
inverse Mills ratio for the payday loan pricing model (1).  Dependent variable = 1 if at least one payday 
lender operated in the Zip code during the 2000-2006 sample period. 
 
  Coefficient  Standard 
Error  Chi-square p-value 
Intercept  -1.295*** 0.3796  11.64  0.0006 
POPULATION SHARE  479.1086*** 42.9454  124.46  <0.0001 
INCOME PERHH  -0.0262*** 0.009  8.57  0.0034 
HOUSE VALUE  -0.0003 0.0013 0.06  0.8127 
BRANCHES PERCAP  0.5863*** 0.1881  9.72  0.0018 
BUSINESSES PERCAP  3.6748** 1.6582  4.91  0.0267 
%BLACK  1.8523 1.5637 1.4  0.2362 
%HISPANIC  0.7581 0.631 1.44  0.2296 
MILITARY  0.9157* 0.5397 2.88  0.0898 
 
 
 
 
 
 